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This article analyzes the Fair Trade sector as a “mixed-form market”, i.e. a market in which 
different types of players (in this case, nonprofit, co-operative and for-profit organizations) 
coexist and compete. The purposes of this article are (1) to understand the factors that have led 
Fair Trade to become a mixed-form market and (2) to propose some trails to understand the 
market dynamics that result from the interactions between the different types of players. We 
start by defining briefly Fair Trade, its different dimensions (including the “fair” quality of the 
products) and its organizational landscape, focusing on the distinction between the pioneer 
“Alternative Trading Organizations” and the second-mover companies. Then, we recall the 
theoretical emergence factors for each type of organization (nonprofit, co-operative and for-
profit) and apply these emergence factors to the context of Fair Trade. This analysis allows us 
to capture the specificities of each type of operator with regard to Fair Trade and, thus, to have 
a better understanding of the dynamics in the sector. Such dynamics includes competition, but 
also conflict and partnership. Our analysis includes elements on ethical imitation, consumers’ 
behaviors, effects on welfare and the role of the government. 
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The dynamics of Fair Trade as a mixed-form market 
Introduction 
Among the recent trends towards ethical and sustainable consumption, Fair Trade (FT) is 
probably one of the fastest growing and most promising initiatives. Even though FT sales still 
do not exceed 0.01% of the total trade in the world, their size1 and growth rate2 make it much 
more than an anecdotic phenomenon (Krier, 2005; Nicholls and Opal, 2005).  
Simultaneously to the commercial success of fairly traded products, research on Fair Trade has 
started to lift off in the last years (Moore, 2004; Nicholls and Opal, 2005). Whereas there has been 
a lot of work on the two extremes of the FT chain – producers and consumers –, the 
intermediaries of the chain, mainly the FT operators in the North3, have received less attention. 
The reason is, probably, that these organizations are supposed to link the demand and the 
supply-side under precise conditions fixed by the FT label or code they subscribe to. Therefore, 
it can seem less important to consider the way these intermediary organizations are structured. 
However, far from being “black boxes” that conduct FT activities in a homogeneous way, these 
organizations, on the contrary, can have very diverse structures, objectives and ways of 
functioning. The pioneers of the movement have mainly been nonprofit (or “not-for-profit”) 
and co-operative organizations with a strong attention to regulation (the setting up of new rules 
for conducting trade in a fair way), education (the initiatives aiming to raise the awareness of 
consumers) and development (a close relationship with the producers in the South). These 
pioneer fair-traders are often referred to as “Alternative trading organizations” (ATOs).4 
The initial development of FT by ATOs has attracted a growing number of mainstreaming “for-
profit” companies in the last years. These companies have emerged mainly in the distribution 
area (supermarkets selling FT products), but also in the import and the transformation of fairly 
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traded goods (for instance, coffee roasters or chocolate companies). As a parallel to the 
mainstreaming of FT, ATOs, on their turn, have evolved towards a more commercial profile. 
As a result, Fair Trade now appears as “mixed-form market” where different types of players 
coexist. Such a coexistence induces specific market dynamics that deserve a special attention. 
Thus, the purposes of this article are (1) to understand the factors that have led Fair Trade to 
become a mixed-form market and (2) to propose some trails to understand the market dynamics 
that result from the interactions among the different types of players. We start by defining 
briefly Fair Trade, its different dimensions and its organizational landscape (part 1). Then, we 
recall the theoretical emergence factors for each type of organization (nonprofit, co-operative 
and for-profit) and apply these emergence factors to the context of Fair Trade (part 2). This 
analysis allows us to capture the specificities of each type of operator with regard to Fair Trade 
and, thus, to have a better understanding of the market dynamics in the sector, through 
competition, conflict and partnership (part 3). 
1. Fair Trade and its diverse players 
1.1. The Fair Trade concept 
The definition which gathers most agreement and is most widely used by field actors and 
academics (Moore, 2004) is the FINE5 definition: 
Fair Trade is a trading partnership, based on dialogue, transparency and respect, that seeks 
greater equity in international trade. It contributes to sustainable development by offering 
better trading conditions to, and securing the rights of, marginalized producers and workers - 
especially in the South. Fair Trade organizations (backed by consumers) are engaged actively 
in supporting producers, awareness raising and in campaigning for changes in the rules and 
practice of conventional international trade. 
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It appears from this definition and from the sector’s observation that Fair Trade is a highly 
multidimensional concept. While everyone agrees on the multidimensional character of Fair 
Trade, these multiple dimensions can be organized in different ways (Nicholls and Opal, 2005). 
In our view, the elements that constitute the FT concept can be grouped under four main 
categories: 
• Trade:  
Albeit “fair”, we are talking about “trade”. FT operators conduct market activities (import, 
transformation, distribution) similar to any commercial initiative (Nicholls and Opal, 2005).  
The positioning of trade within the missions of FT operators, however, can vary, from a mean 
to produce more development in the South, to a goal on its own. When analyzing the FT 
product, the “trade” dimension can be assimilated to the material character of the good. Indeed, 
it is not the product in itself that is “fair”: nothing distinguishes physically a FT banana from a 
conventional one. Rather, it is the bundle of invisible characteristics linked to the conditions 
under which the good has been produced and traded (Becchetti and Adriani, 2002).  
• Fairness:  
Thus, the “fair” dimension constitutes the specific and powerful – albeit invisible – attribute of 
FT products, differentiating them from non-FT products (Nicholls and Opal, 2005).  This “fair” 
characteristic is linked to both the producers and the importers of FT products. While the 
former must respect a number of organizational criteria (small-scale producers, democratic 
decision-making, no discrimination,…), the latter are entitled to specific trading conditions 
(fair price, social premium, pre-financing, long-term relationship,…).  
The fair price consists in a “countercyclical mark-up” that can reach more than 100 percent of 
the market price (see the example of coffee, cocoa and bananas), and that is provided by FT 
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importers to first level producer organizations and, ultimately, to individual producers. 
Opponents of this price rule say that it is not market clearing, that it creates excess supply and 
that it constitutes a distortion of market mechanisms. Advocates of it have two main 
counterarguments: 1) the market price is not competitive and reflects the 
monopsonistic/oligopsonistic structure of trades between local producers and intermediaries. In 
these cases a higher minimum price (analogous to the one created by ATOs) is the solution to 
this specific market failure; 2) the FT product (e.g. FT coffee) is a new and distinct variety of 
the product and, as such, has its own market price determined by the equilibrium between 
supply and concerned consumers demand (Becchetti and Adriani, 2002). In this sense fair trade 
can be truly interpreted as a form of product innovation. 
Research on Fair Trade has tried to determine whether the fair price and the other FT tools 
effectively lead to a better socio-economic development for the producers than in the case of 
standard trade (i.e., whether Fair Trade leads to less inequality than standard trade by 
increasing the producers’ remunerations). Maseland and De Vaal (2002) argue that this is the 
case only when product demand is inelastic and consumers have fairness preferences. Hayes 
(2003), however, argues that their approach is too narrow as it does not take into account non-
monetary characteristics of the FT activity (production prefinancing, provision of local public 
goods, promotion of consumer awareness, etc.). 
• Education:  
Fair Trade can also be seen as a tool for consumers’ education. Some FT operators, mainly 
ATOs, conduct education campaigns directed to the consumers. These campaigns are intended 
to promote Fair Trade and, more globally, to educate citizens (and governments) toward 
consumption habits that are more respectful for the environment and the people, especially for 
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the producers in the South. Even if all the FT operators do not conduct educational activities, it 
can be assumed that FT consumers finance a part of these activities through their purchases. 
• Regulation:  
At the origins of Fair Trade, there is the intent of setting up a new regulation framework for 
commercial exchanges. This framework is, first, applied within the FT partnerships through a 
number of specific criteria. Furthermore, the FT regulation framework also aims at influencing 
the mainstream commercial practices within international exchanges. The design and the 
control of the specific norms within the FT sector have been progressively carried by specific 
FTOs that do not conduct trade of commodities but focus on the creation and the control of the 
FT norms (this is being referred to as the “labeling” process). 
How can we characterize these dimensions from an economic point of view?  
- The material characteristic of the FT product is a classical private good. Similarly to 
any consumption good, the product in its physical dimension is financed and consumed 
by Northern consumers and produced by growers or craftsmen in the South. 
- The “fair” character of the product, even though involving material elements, is a trust 
good. Indeed, the concrete application of the FT principles by companies is something 
that cannot be observed directly by the consumer. Because the beneficiaries of the fair 
characteristic (the producers in the South) are located far from the ones who finance it 
(the consumers in the North), there is an information asymmetry that requires a certain 
level of trust from the consumers.6 It is worth noting that also consumers (and not just 
producers) are beneficiaries of the fairness dimension of FT. Recent theoretical 
advancements in experimental economics have documented that fairness and inequity 
aversion play an important role in consumer preferences. Consumers with such 
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preferences buy FT products not for pure altruism but to satisfy their specific 
preferences (Fehr and Schmidt, 2002; 1999; Sobel, 2005). 
- The dimensions of education and regulation are close to (quasi-) public or collective 
goods. A public good (Milgrom and Roberts, 1992) is defined as non-rival (the 
consumption by an agent does not diminish the available quantities for other agents) 
and non-excludable (it is impossible to exclude an agent from the consumption of the 
good). The education of citizens towards more sustainable consumption habits and the 
setting up of new rules for commercial exchanges are two elements that cannot be 
divided into separate consumption units (non-excludability) and for which it is 
impossible to exclude the consumption through the payment of a price (non-rivalry). 
It thus appears that Fair Trade is composed of private, public and trust dimensions. Table 1 
summarizes the producers, the beneficiaries and the financers of these different dimensions. 
The multidimensional character is likely to play an important role for explaining the diversity 
of organizations participating to Fair Trade (Huybrechts, 2007). Indeed, the nature of the 
produced goods constitutes a major explanation for the differences in institutional choices 
(Anheier, 2005; Ben-Ner, 2002; Ben-Ner and Van Hoomissen, 1991; Handy, 1997). 
Table n°1: The different dimensions of Fair Trade 
 
 Nature Producers Beneficiaries 
Trade – material 
good 




Fairness – fair 
characteristic 




Education  ATOs (North) Consumers (North) 




1.2. The diversity within the Fair Trade landscape 
FT operators can be classified according to different criteria. In this context, we propose to 
differentiate these organizations on the basis of their (1) missions, (2) legal forms and (3) types 
of consumers served, three criteria which may be partly overlapping. 
  1.2.1. Missions 
All the participants to Fair Trade do not necessarily pursue jointly the four dimensions 
presented above. While “trade” and “fairness” are the minimal requirements for all participants, 
differences can be observed between the organizations that focus on trade and the organizations 
that have a wider view of Fair Trade. Thus, two types of FT operators can be distinguished: 
- “Alternative trading organizations”, which are totally or principally dedicated to Fair 
Trade. ATOs have built the foundations of the FT movement and continue to play an 
essential role in its qualitative (but also quantitative) development (LeClair, 2002). 
- The companies that have added the import, transformation and/or distribution of FT 
products to their pre-existing activities. Thanks to the development of FT labeling, these 
“second-mover companies” have often “adopted Fair Trade in the face of consumer 
pressure to meet a market opportunity” (Nicholls and Opal, 2005, p. 80). Supermarket 
channels and multinational food companies are typical examples of second-movers, for 
whom FT products only represent a part of their sales.8 
Nicholls and Opal (2005) identify three criteria that differentiate ATOs from second-mover 
companies. Two of them seem particularly adequate to characterize ATOs: (1) a majority of 
products traded under the FT principles and (2) an organizational commitment to Fair Trade as the 
main goal (instead of profit maximization). 
1.2.2. Legal forms 
 9 
Historically, ATOs have emerged under “non-capitalist” or “Third Sector” forms such as 
nonprofit organizations (NPOs) and co-operatives. However, in the last years, ATOs have also 
adopted “mainstream” commercial forms such as companies limited by shares or privately 
owned corporations. Following the economic literature, we will call the latter “for-profit 
organizations” (as opposed to nonprofits), even though ATOs, according to the second criterion 
by Nicholls and Opal, do not seek primarily to make profits. ATOs under a “for-profit” status 
can thus be considered as commercial companies that do not seek profit maximization, which 
brings them close to Third Sector organizations or “social enterprises” (Nicholls, 2006). 
As mentioned earlier, a growing number of ATOs are in fact “groups” that gather different 
entities: a nonprofit and a co-operative (e.g. Oxfam Wereldwinkels in Belgium, IDEAS in 
Spain, Equal Exchange in the UK,…) or a nonprofit and a commercial company (e.g. 
Traidcraft in the UK, Dritte Welt Partner in Germany or CONA in Austria).  
Concerning mainstream market players that have become interested in Fair Trade, they are 
mainly for-profit companies, from small ventures to multinational corporations. However, it is 
also possible to have NPOs and co-operatives act as second-mover companies. The Co-op 
group in the United Kingdom and the COOP in Italy, for example, have included FT products 
in their assortment, considering the inclusion of such products coherent to their philosophy.9 
In spite of these exceptions, for the clarity of our analysis and in order to focus on the dominant 
characteristics of “pioneers” and second movers, we will consider that ATOs are Third Sector 
organizations and that second-mover companies have a profit-maximizing goal. 
1.2.3 Types of ethical consumer served 
Empirical analyses about FT consumers’ behaviors show the existence of some differences 
between consumers purchasing FT products at specific FT outlets (the “worldshops” often 
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owned by ATOs) and consumers purchasing from mainstream for-profit firms such as 
supermarkets (Becchetti and Rosati, 2007). First, consumers who care more about distance to 
the shops and who are more concerned about opening hours and online sales are more likely to 
buy in supermarkets. Hence, it is likely that mainstream for-profit firms selling in supermarkets 
or being themselves distributors serve a different type of consumers than worldshops do. 
Worldshops remain, indeed, selling places where consumer education and awareness on socio-
political matters is much higher, thus they are preferred by “social activist” consumers. 
Second, since mainstream for-profit firms have superior economies of scale, they may sell FT 
products at lower prices. Hence, in the logic of the model that will be discussed in section 3.2, 
they may attract consumers with a different trade-off between price and ethical content of the 
product. With this respect, emphasizing the picture somehow, one could say that consumers 
who require the selling organization to be fully active in FT, who accept higher premia and 
who care more about regulation issues and information about the producers are more likely to 
buy from worldshops, while consumers attaching more weight to the price and non price 
features discussed above are more likely to buy from supermarkets. 
2. Reasons for the presence of different types of players 
Focusing on the organizational diversity in terms of legal forms, let us now try to explain why 
each of these forms has been chosen by a number of FT players, following the literature on 
nonprofit, co-operative and for-profit forms within a “mixed-form market”. 
2.1. Nonprofit organizations 
Nonprofit organizations are characterized by the “non-distribution constraint”, i.e. the 
prohibition to distribute net earnings (after taxes and expenses) to any “residual claimant” 
(Hansmann, 1980). The people in charge of the organization (on the Board of Directors) have 
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the residual control right (the ultimate decision-making power) but cannot sell this right nor 
claim any right on the assets of the organization. Thus, there is no owner with complete 
property rights (both the rights on control and on residual income). 
The emergence factors of nonprofit organizations have been studied on two different sides: the 
demand-side and the supply-side (Ben-Ner and Gui, 2000; Steinberg, 2006).  
2.1.1. Supply-side arguments 
On the supply-side, the intent is to understand why entrepreneurs have chosen the nonprofit 
form for their venture instead of the mainstream for-profit form. Several authors (James, 1987; 
Rose-Ackerman, 1987) observe that idealistic entrepreneurs are likely to prefer the nonprofit 
status because it is the most coherent with their ideal. In the case of Fair Trade, it is likely that 
pioneer entrepreneurs with the goal of helping poor producers in the South have not imagined 
adopting an organizational form that would have allowed the generation of profits for 
themselves. Moreover, the choice of the nonprofit status serves as a guarantee to all the 
stakeholders (and particularly to the consumers) that the goal of the organization is not to make 
profits but to pursue a social mission (Rose-Ackerman, 1987). In this case, the main goal is the 
improvement of the living conditions of small-scale producers in the South.  
2.1.2. Demand-side arguments 
On the demand-side, the emergence factors are linked with the types of goods produced. First, 
in the presence of trust goods, nonprofit organizations are more likely to overcome the 
problems of information asymmetry. Indeed, when the “ethical” quality of the good is not 
easily observable, the nonprofit status, because of its non-distribution constraint, is more likely 
to overcome the “market failure” as identified by Akerlof (1970). When there is an information 
asymmetry, for instance when the financer of the good is different from its beneficiary, the 
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former needs guarantees that the firm will not act in an opportunistic way by delivering a 
product with lower quality than announced.  
This argument finds a perfect illustration in the case of the FT purchase: given that the 
consumer in the North cannot verify immediately whether the Fair principles announced by the 
FT operator (fair price and premium, prefinancing,…) are fully enforced, he will ask for 
guarantees from the firm when purchasing the product. In the case where there is no generally 
recognized labeling system10, the non-distribution constraint can precisely fulfill the role of 
trust signal, at least ensuring to the financer of the good (the Northern consumer) that the 
additional price that he pays for a good with a FT quality will not be appropriated by the 
shareholders.  
One could object that the nonprofit firm might still act in an opportunistic way, for example by 
using the FT price differential for raising the salaries of the managers (this phenomenon is 
called “implicit distribution”, as opposed to explicit distribution of the surplus to the 
shareholders). That is why nonprofits generally add other trust guarantees in order to secure 
their social mission, such as the involvement of different stakeholders, including donors and 
voluntary workers, in their decision-making structures (Ben-Ner and Gui, 2000; Enjolras, 
2000). The rationale is the following: if these stakeholders, who are close to the organization, 
are ready to give money (donors) or time (voluntary workers) “for free”, it is highly unlikely 
that the firm acts in a opportunistic way against the announced goals. 
Beside trust goods, a second category of goods that nonprofit organizations traditionally 
produce is public goods, i.e. non-rival and non-excludable goods (Milgrom and Roberts, 1992). 
These goods cannot be provided by for-profit companies due to the problem of free-riding. 
Indeed, consumers can benefit from a public good without paying for it or only at a lower tariff 
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than what they would be ready to pay. Thus, a for-profit firm will be reluctant to produce such 
a good and the demand will not be met (“sub-optimal provision”).  
That is why it is traditionally the government which produces public goods (e.g. defense, 
education,…). However, governmental action is constrained due to the “median voter” 
problem. According to Weisbrod (1975), when defining the optimal quantity of public good 
produced, the State chooses the quantity preferred by the median voter. Thus, two categories of 
people necessarily remain unsatisfied: those who would prefer less public good and those who 
would prefer more. For the latter, one solution in order to obtain the additional quantity of 
desired public good can be the creation of a nonprofit organization.  
Nonprofit organizations are said to be better able to overcome the free-riding problem because 
consumers will be more likely to reveal their preferences to a firm with a lesser likelihood of 
opportunism, and because the nonprofit will be able to raise other resources than through the 
sales (e.g. donations, public grants and voluntary work) (Kingma, 1997; Weisbrod, 1975). 
The public dimensions of Fair Trade provide, again, an interesting illustration. It can be 
assumed that the public authorities (in a wide sense, i.e. supranational authorities such as the 
European Union and the World Trade Organization) have chosen a level of regulation for 
international trade that leaves a whole portion of the population unsatisfied (i.e., they would 
prefer more regulation, for instance, minimum prices for producers in the South). One of the 
solutions for these consumers is to finance a nonprofit that will propose a stronger regulation 
framework, through gifts or, more interestingly, through the joint purchase of a product traded 
under that specific regulation framework. Nonprofit ATOs may not only partially solve the 
problem of the heterogeneity of North consumers’ preferences on public goods, but also the 
misrepresentation of preferences of individuals (and marginalized producers) in the South due 
to the imperfections in the mechanisms of representation in international institutions. 
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2.1.3. “Demand creating supply” 
The latter example of unsatisfied consumers has shown that the supply of goods through a 
nonprofit structure may come from the demand itself. Indeed, when there are demanding 
stakeholders who do not find an existing provider for the good they expect, a solution can be to 
become themselves nonprofit entrepreneurs (Ben-Ner and Van Hoomissen, 1991). It is likely 
that a number of pioneer FT entrepreneurs are the ones who were initially interested, as 
consumers, in buying fairly traded goods but couldn’t influence neither the State (because of 
the median voter problem) nor for-profit companies (because of the risks of opportunism). The 
creation of a nonprofit organization has allowed these potential consumers to satisfy their 
demand and to keep the control on the quality of the demanded good. 
2.2. Co-operatives  
2.2.1. In the South 
The co-operative form is particularly widespread among producer organizations in the South. 
The reasons that explain the grouping of producers into co-operatives are to be found in the 
configuration of local markets. Those markets are characterized by (1) a monopsonostic 
situation, that is a high number of providers for a low number of purchasers, and (2) a situation 
of information asymmetry.  
The monopsonistic situation as a factor of emergence of co-operatives is described by 
Hansmann (1996) and can be applied to FT co-operatives in the South (Hayes, 2005; Nicholls 
and Opal, 2005). Indeed, in local markets of primary goods such as coffee, bananas or cocoa, 
there are plenty of individual producers for only a few buyers. These buyers have strong 
incentives to take advantage of their market power in order to abuse the producers. Their 
market power is reinforced by the information asymmetries concerning the prices and the 
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quality of the goods: it is easy to cheat on an individual producer who has no information about 
the market prices and on the quality of his production.11 
In this context, the creation of a co-operative is a solution that allows small-scale producers to 
control the prices at which they sell their goods and, thus, to avoid the high costs they would 
assume if conducting their transactions individually on the market (Hansmann, 1999). The 
inclusion of the co-operative in the FT chain reinforces the appropriation of market power by 
the producers. Indeed, Fair Trade allows these producers to get access to export markets and to 
develop organizational capacities (Hayes, 2006). Thus, from an economic point of view, Fair 
Trade can be justified by its support to local co-operatives as solutions to the market failures 
faced by small-scale producers (Hayes, 2006; Nicholls and Opal, 2005).  
2.2.2. In the North 
The co-operative form is chosen by some import and distribution operators in the North 
(Develtere and Pollet, 2005). It can be fair-traders having chosen the co-operative status from 
the beginning, or nonprofits that have evolved as groups including a co-operative structure. 
Why has the co-operative form attracted some FT operators? Unlike in the South, the reasons 
do not lie in the market configuration in the North. When monopolies or oligopolies are 
observable, for instance in the food distribution sector, the co-operative responses historically 
take the form of consumers gathering in order to obtain lower prices through joint purchases. In 
the case of Fair Trade, it is exactly the opposite: consumers want to pay higher prices than 
market standards in order to contribute to the development of producers in the South. Thus, the 
factors of emergence of FT co-operatives in the North are different from traditional co-
operatives, given that the former aim at providing an advantage to external stakeholder groups 
(the producers in the South) and not to themselves. FT co-operatives can thus be qualified as 
“general interest” organizations (as opposed to traditional “mutual interest” co-operatives). 
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We believe that the factors of emergence of FT co-operatives in the North are very similar to 
those of nonprofit organizations. Indeed, the differences that can be observed between the two 
types of structures seem much less important than their common features. First, in terms of 
their capacity to provide trust goods. For some authors, the limited distribution of profits and 
the democratic decision-making processes within co-operatives provide trust signals which are 
as strong as those enjoyed by nonprofits (Mertens, 2005; Spear, 2000). The guarantee given to 
the consumers that their FT purchase will benefit to the producers as it is announced12 is 
reinforced because of the “general interest” nature of FT co-operatives, which is confirmed by 
the presence of donors and voluntary workers in some of them. 
Secondly, co-operatives are also able - although probably to a lower extent - to propose public 
goods such as education and regulation. Like nonprofits, general interest co-operatives can 
sometimes raise non-commercial resources (gifts, voluntary work or public grants) in order to 
provide such public goods (Spear, 2000). 
There are, though, differences between nonprofits and co-operatives. While the former are 
generally restricted in their commercial activities, depending on the national legislations, the 
latter have no legal constraints on their commercial development (Levi, 2005). Furthermore, 
co-operatives have a better access to capital and stronger economic incentives given the 
authorized – albeit restricted – profit distribution (Hansmann, 1999). 
As a conclusion, nonprofit and co-operative ATOs seem relatively similar. Nonprofits are 
probably better equipped for the provision of public goods, while co-operatives have an 
advantage from the commercial point of view. But both types of structures can be qualified as 
“social enterprises”, i.e. organizations that conduct a commercial activity with an explicit goal 
of pursuing social missions and serving the community rather than making profit (Defourny, 
2001; Defourny and Nyssens, 2006; Nicholls, 2006). These social enterprises involved in Fair 
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Trade will then choose their legal form in function of their national legislation. In Belgium, for 
instance, the ATOs that have split into two different structures (a nonprofit and a co-operative) 
have done so because of the restricting legislation applying to the commercial development of 
nonprofits. In Italy, the new legal framework of “social co-operative” is particularly suited for 
ATOs as it allows combining commercial dynamism with social purposes. 
2.3. “For-profit” mainstream companies 
Basically, “for-profit”13 companies, i.e. mainstream companies that are privately held or 
limited by shares, only produce private goods. For public goods, as it has been mentioned, for-
profit companies cannot overcome free-riding problems and thus cannot provide a sufficient 
quantity of public good to meet the demand left unsatisfied by the government. For trust goods, 
the suspicion of opportunistic behavior could undermine for-profit firms’ trustworthiness with 
regard to the announced quality. In brief, for-profit companies are theoretically better able to 
provide the “material dimension” of the FT good but they have difficulties in convincing the 
consumer about its “fair” quality. This is one of the reasons why mainstream for-profit 
companies have remained absent of the FT sector until the middle of the 1990s. 
Thus, which factors have allowed mainstream for-profit companies to integrate the sector in the 
last decade? Three major evolutions can be underpinned. First, the FT sector has evolved 
rapidly from a small-scale charitable initiative conducted by volunteers with low-quality 
products to a well-organized and increasingly professional trade niche. By doing so, ATOs 
(mainly nonprofits and co-operatives) have revealed an existing demand for ethical products 
and provided a credible response. Of course, the participation of mainstream companies has 
further developed the scale and the professionalism of Fair Trade. But it is thanks to the initial 
efforts of pioneer ATOs, who have shown that Fair Trade could be profitable, that mainstream 
companies have become interested in joining the movement. 
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Secondly, there has been a dissociation between the commercial provision of the goods and the 
certification of their fair quality. This corresponds to the development of the labeling process. 
Whereas, previously, the fair quality of a good was linked to the institutional quality signals of 
the FT providers (i.e. the trust signals of nonprofits and co-operatives), the label gathers these 
quality signals in a package that can be bought by any company. As a result, it is no longer the 
company in itself that must demonstrate the compliance with the FT criteria, but it is the label 
directly linked to the goods. That is why for-profit companies have been able to join the FT 
sector without being suspected of lower “fair” quality. 
Thirdly, with the rise of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR), mainstream companies have 
seen in Fair Trade an ideal opportunity to demonstrate ethical concerns to their stakeholders at 
a relatively low cost. Indeed, in a context of suspicion concerning the practices of 
multinationals, Fair Trade constitutes a powerful ethical signal towards the company’s 
stakeholders even when the proportion of FT products in the total assortment is low. 
The consideration that mainstream companies have historically been followers and not 
originators of the FT market (and that their interest is conditional to their profit maximization 
goals) does not imply that their role is not important. Indeed, due to their size with respect to 
that of “pioneers”, their entry into the FT market has been crucial to FT mainstreaming and to 
the further development of consumer awareness on this issue.  
An additional evidence of the positive role of mainstreaming emerges from Becchetti and 
Rosati (2007) who find on a large sample of Italian consumers that purchases in supermarkets 
and worldshops are complementary and not substitutes and that awareness of FT criteria 
induced by purchases in supermarkets is just slightly lower than that induced by purchases in 
worldshops. Now that we have understood why for-profit companies have become interested in 
Fair Trade, let us see how these companies interact with ATOs within the same market. 
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3. Market dynamics 
One the one hand, we have ATOs (mainly nonprofits and co-operatives) which are generally 
not only active in trading but also in education, lobbying, and development activities. Some of 
them have volunteers and many rely on gifts and public grants, beside their commercial 
incomes. On the other hand, mainstream (mainly for-profit) companies are involved in the 
sector with trade as their core business.  
Witnessing diverse types of organizations with different objectives active in the same sector, 
the question is: how do these organizations interact with each other and what are the results of 
these interactions on the FT market? 
3.1. Types of interactions 
Fair Trade can be qualified as a “mixed-form market” (Huybrechts et al., 2006), i.e. a market in 
which for-profit, nonprofit and sometimes government providers coexist. The literature about 
mixed-form markets focuses mainly on competition between providers of different types, 
considering them as adversaries competing on the same type of products (Bagnoli and Watts, 
2003; Marwell and McInerney, 2005; Schiff and Weisbrod, 1991; Steinberg, 1987). Indeed, 
there are some markets, such as health care or education, where there is competition between 
for-profit, nonprofit and governmental providers (Marmor et al., 1987). 
However, competition is not the only type of relationship that can bind organizations of 
different forms. Two other types of interactions deserve an attention: conflict and partnership 
(Abzug and Webb, 1999). We start by describing in detail the dynamics of competition 
between ATOs (generally nonprofit or co-operative organizations) and second-mover 
(generally for-profit) companies, on the basis of previous theoretical models. We analyze the 
competition on fairly traded goods considering their “fair dimension” as a socially responsible 
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quality. Then, we see how competition between different types of players can trigger conflicts 
and differentiation behaviors. The conflict between world shops, importers and labeling 
organizations constitutes a striking example of it. Then, we illustrate to which extent FT 
operators of different types can develop partnership dynamics. Finally, we analyze the role of 
the government and the extent to which its interventions could have an influence on the 
dynamics of different players coexisting within the FT market. 
3.2. Competition in the Fair Trade sector 
3.2.1. Competition models 
Theoretical models impose severe limitations on the richness of the reality but may be of help 
to disclose connections or logical questions that are not immediately evident in it. 
In this perspective, some interesting hints on the dynamics of the FT market may be provided 
by several theoretical contributions which have tried to model FT competition in the last 
decade (Manasakis et al., 2006). The starting point has been that of working on horizontal 
differentiation models. In the standard textbook horizontal differentiation model, two ice-cream 
sellers compete on a beach by producing a homogeneous product at the same price (Hotelling, 
1929). The only strategic competitive factor is location on the beach since consumers have 
positive costs of distance and will purchase from the closer producer. In FT competition, 
geographical space is reinterpreted as the space of “ethical distance” and any point on the 
segment identifies a given willingness to pay for the “socially responsible” features (i.e. the 
public good or the trust good component) of the FT product (see Figure 1).  
The line which is upward sloping from the left calculates total (psychological plus monetary) 
costs of the consumer located on the corresponding point (perpendicular projection) of the 
segment when he buys the for-profit producer’s product. The more distant the consumer from 
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the left extreme of the segment, the stronger his ethical concerns and the higher the 
psychological cost added to the monetary cost of the product. The line which is upward sloping 
from the right illustrates the same total costs for consumers located on the corresponding point 
of the segment when buying the FT product. Here again, ethical distance between the consumer 
and the product generates psychological costs but the slope is flatter since such costs are 
reasonably assumed to be stronger when the consumer’s “ethical” sensitiveness is higher than 
when it is lower than the product’s ethical content. The perpendicular projection of the crossing 
of the two slopes on the segment identifies the consumer who is indifferent between the two 
products and therefore also the boundary between the two producers’ market shares.   
A first static version of this model assumes invariance of consumers’ tastes takes into account 
the history of Fair Trade and starts with the entry of FT importers into the market which was 
previously controlled by profit-maximizing incumbents (i.e. food multinationals)14. An ATO 
locates herself at the extreme right of the segment (the most ethical position) and conquers 
consumers who are closer to her (i.e. with strongest ethical concern). Considering 
conventionally any move to the right of the segment as an increase in the cost paid for the 
socially responsible features of the products on the supply side (and of the willingness to pay 
for them by consumers on the demand side), the crucial issue is whether ATOs’ entry triggers a 
rightward move on the segment of the profit maximizing incumbent (ethical imitation).   
What these models observe is that ATOs have positive market shares after entry and shrink the 
market of the incumbent under reasonable parametric conditions. They also demonstrate that 
the latter finds it optimal, in its profit-maximizing approach, to move to the right in order to 
conquer back these ethical consumers as far as the marginal cost of increasing its socially 
responsible stance is more than compensated by the gains in terms of recovering previously lost 
consumers (see Figure 1). Incumbent’s imitation is necessarily partial if it wants to maintain its 
profit maximizing identity.15  
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The decision on the symmetry/asymmetry of ethical distance costs is not a trivial one when 
modeling FT competition. Do consumers perceive a psychological cost only when they buy a 
product which incorporates less, or also when it incorporates more ethical values with respect 
to their opinion on the issue?16  Even if the doubt remains, it is reasonable to assume that the 
psychological cost is higher in the first case (i.e. when consumers buy a good with lower SR 
quality with respect to that considered optimal by them). If, on the other hand, we go to the 
extreme of considering null the cost of higher ethical content (i.e. when consumers do not mind 
buying a product with higher SR quality with respect to that considered optimal by them), we 
move to a vertical differentiation context in which SR is conceived exactly as an improvement 
in quality on which everyone agrees.     
In view of these considerations it is reasonable to assume that the reality is in the middle so that 
the approach used for modeling FT competition can be extended to all those cases in which we 
have a “quality improvement” on which consumers have mixed opinions (someone may not 
approve the FT scheme exactly as someone may dislike the fact that a restaurant has installed 
indoor TV maxi-screen facilities). 
  3.2.2. Competition dynamics 
Another interesting insight of the product differentiation models is obtained when we relax our 
assumption on the invariance of consumer tastes and reasonably assume that ethical 
sensitiveness increases with awareness and FT consumption habits, as some recent empirical 
findings seem to demonstrate (Kohler, 2006). In such a case, the  for-profit incumbent finds it 
optimal to be more aggressive in its SR imitation policy in order to reduce the influence of the 
pioneer and to slow down the process of growth of ethical concern which imposes to him to 
increase SR costs .  
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A crucial question we pose in this model is whether ATOs’ entry in the market is actually 
necessary to explain the increased sensitiveness for SR of the incumbent. Apart from the fact 
that the historical course of events definitely suggests that this was the case, it is possible to 
demonstrate this from a theoretical point of view. First, SR products are generally low margin 
products that contribute little to the profits. Hence, when the law of motion of consumers’ 
ethical concerns is the one indicated above, the incumbent has no interest in reinforcing ethical 
concerns of consumers by creating SR products, even if he is perfectly informed about 
consumer tastes on this issue. Second, the provision of SR products is associated with costs due 
to the problem of information. When seeking to convince consumers of the higher SR quality 
of its products, a for-profit company faces costs17 that are likely to be higher than the benefits 
returning from the gain of new customers. For these reasons, the arrival of nonprofit and co-
operative ATOs who face less “trust costs” is necessary to put pressure on the profit 
maximizing incumbents and thus generate a SR dynamics. 
The competition dynamics in the FT market as presented above find common points with the 
theoretical mixed-form market model proposed by Marwell and McInerney (2005)18. These 
authors identify three types of market configurations that can result from mixed-form 
competition: a stratified market (where NPOs and for-profit companies serve separate segments 
of the consumer population), a displaced market (where NPOs are pushed out by for-profits) 
and a defended market (where NPOs resist on the basis of specific tools that for-profit 
companies do not possess).  
The previous analysis has shown that Fair Trade can be considered alternatively as a stratified 
or as a defended market. If all consumers had the same expectations in terms of SR quality, for-
profit companies would try to conquer these consumers but would face resistance from NPOs 
which face fewer costs when producing ethical quality (the trust and public good dimensions). 
If, more realistically, we assume that consumers have heterogeneous ethical concerns, than 
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both types of players will address the needs of the consumer population that is the closest to its 
ethical positioning (“high SR quality” for ATOs versus “low SR quality” for mainstream 
companies). Conform to the previous analysis, both types of players will try to increase their 
consumer population at the expense of its competitors: ATOs by trying to increase the global 
ethical concern and for-profit companies by slowing it down. 
  3.2.3. Effects on welfare 
On the welfare point of view, one of the most interesting findings of these models is the 
paradox of a duopoly which generates higher social transfers to primary producers than what 
should be regarded as optimal by a social planner maximizing the welfare of consumers in the 
North. With this respect the FT market mechanism seems able to solve the political delegation 
problem of many contexts in which we have North-South interdependence but economic 
decisions are taken by authorities who decide only on the basis of voters of the North. This 
confirms our theoretical assumption that Fair Trade can be seen as a response to a state failure 
and more specifically as a market substitute for a missing global governance. With this we do 
not mean that FT bottom-up action should be a permanent substitute for the search of new 
global governance rules, but just that it is substituting them at present time in which such rules 
are not at sight and, in the meanwhile, it is positively contributing to their generation by 
creating tangible consensus around them.  
In this sense, Fair Trade constitutes an interesting example of what we can define as the 
“subsidiarity principle”. Under given conditions, and sufficiently high levels of corruption and 
“waste” on standard government aid, public authorities may find it optimal to create tax 
incentives for Fair Trade in order to achieve the same result with much lower public 
expenditure and a more tailored intervention. Indeed, as we have explained earlier, the 
heterogeneity of the demand for a public good such as development aid makes it easier for 
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ATOs to provide this good than it is for the government: taxpayers may not agree on the 
development aid linked with Fair Trade, while FT consumers explicitly do it when they buy the 
product. If we consider also the “warm glow” argument of Andreoni (1990) in which 
consumers prefer to give directly and do not consider this action as a perfect substitute of an 
identical intervention realized by public authorities with money collected from their taxes, we 
clearly understand why a subsidiary intervention may be not just more effective but also 
superior in terms of consumers’/taxpayers’ utility.19   
Throughout this analysis, we have considered two categories of players: ATOs and second-
mover companies. However, the reality is more complex and both categories should be split 
into a number of sub-categories who have different goals and logics. We will address such 
heterogeneous behaviors through the description of the conflict among different pioneer 
players when confronted to the arrival of mainstream companies in the FT market. 
3.3. Conflict  
Conflict is observed when nonprofit and for-profit organizations oppose each other beyond 
commercial competition (Abzug and Webb, 1999). These conflicts often concern major 
ideological issues. Typically, “political” nonprofits (such as NGOs) raise concerns about 
commercial practices of multinationals that are considered as “socially irresponsible”. In the 
opposite way, mainstream companies sometimes attack nonprofits because of their tax 
exemptions, their public grants (causing “unfair competition”) or, precisely, as a response to 
NGO denunciation campaigns.  
One of the conflicts observed in the development of the FT market is the one among “world 
shops”20, importers and labeling organizations. The simple inspection of the different positions 
of these players on the value chain helps us to understand that their heterogeneous strategic 
goals open the way to the conflict. World shops are dedicated retailers of FT products that may 
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help importing associations to reduce distributional bottlenecks that create a gap between 
potential and actual demand. On the contrary, such channels suffer the competition from any 
other different distribution channel (supermarkets, individual FT promoters, etc.). Finally, 
labeling associations may be tempted to certify new products with FT characteristics created by 
profit maximizing imitators.  
The event that triggers the conflict is the partial imitation of food multinationals and the 
decision of large distribution chains to sell FT products. This decision represents additional 
potential business for labeling organizations while being a competitive threat for pioneer 
importers and world shops. The decision of the umbrella labeling organization FLO to certify 
products sold by these imitators has led to a conflict while demonstrating at the same time that 
one of the merits of FT is that of making social responsibility a competitive variable.  
The reaction of one of the global FT networks (IFAT) has been that of creating a new label (the 
FTO mark) with the goal of marking the difference in SR quality between “partial imitators” 
(who insert one or a few FT products in a wide non-FT product range) and pioneer ATOs (who 
dedicate all their activity to Fair Trade). In order to signal the difference, the new labeling 
strategy of pioneers is that of 1) looking at the entire process and not just at the single product; 
2) not just ensuring a mark-up on market prices for primary producers but also technical 
assistance and advocacy campaigns for changes in trade rules (something that for-profit 
imitators generally do not do, as we have explained earlier). This confirms the intuition that, 
even though the different actors influence each other when competing on the same market, they 
also conserve their basically distinct organizational missions. 
With a specific regard to retailers (worldshops), the strategy to tackle competition from for-
profit firms has been that of specialization on services (marriage lists, coffee provision for 
vending machines, catering) and on products on which economies of scale are lower 
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(craftsmanship, textile products). Worldshops also remain selling places where consumer 
education and awareness on socio-political matters is much higher, being thus preferred by 
“social activist” consumers. 
The previously discussed theoretical models provide a fundamental insight in this evolution of 
the FT market along the two mentioned dimensions of the pioneer/partial imitator and labeling 
organization/importer/worldshop competition. If at the end of the process only the partial 
imitator survives, the risk is the reduced investment in education on SR. If we assume that the 
increase in the demand for FT products leads to a decrease in the demand for non-FT products, 
it seems clear that the for-profit partial imitator has no interest in stimulating the SR concerns 
of consumers since they ultimately lead to an increase in the share of low margin products21 in 
their product portfolio and thereby contradict the profit maximization goal. More drastic 
scenarios (such as extinction of FT market) are to be excluded even in this perspective as far as 
social activism (as it is reasonable to assume) will continue to stimulate consumer awareness 
and producers will have to address their demand.  
3.4. Partnership 
Partnerships between nonprofit and for-profit companies have received a growing attention in 
the literature (Austin, 2000; Galaskiewicz and Colman, 2006; O'Regan and Oster, 2000). 
Partnership may be defined as “collaboration between independent firms over a given 
economic space and time for the attainment of mutually defined goals” (Adobor, 2006, p.122).  
Along the FT value chain, various forms of partnership have been developed among different 
actors. As it is easy to imagine, partnerships are more likely to be developed by players who 
are vertically integrated. One of the most common collaboration models occurs among ATOs, 
for-profit retailers and worldshops. ATOs usually offer to new worldshops franchising schemes 
in which the creation of a new outlet is supported from a financial and organizational point of 
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view under the condition of selling no less than a given share of products imported by the 
“franchisor” ATO. Furthermore, when ATOs conclude selling agreements with for-profit 
retailers, they usually ask to the latter to include worldshops in the venture (under the form of 
participation to profits or intermediation of products to for-profit retailers).  It is worth noting 
that, under this scheme, is the vertical relationship between the ATOs and the supermarket 
which enforces the cooperative agreement between the two types of retailers and not their 
direct cooperation. 
Partnerships among players who are at the same level of the value chain are less frequent, but 
they happen when different players have common goals. These common goals may be 
promoting Fair Trade and raising the general public awareness. In such case, collaboration 
arises under the form of formal or informal ad hoc consortia, for instance for organizing 
advertising and education campaigns or for developing common commercial projects. The first 
type of horizontal collaboration happens, for example, through the organization of a “Fair 
Trade week” in most Northern countries. The second type of partnership may happen among 
companies who face common challenges with a specific product line. In Belgium for instance, 
a special working group has been set up to solve common logistic problems for companies 
importing FT craft, with the view of developing economic synergies. Since these common 
ventures include public good elements, they benefit all players and therefore are a fertile 
ground for collaboration once “free riding” problems are solved in the contractual norms of the 
above mentioned consortia.  
3.5. The role of the government 
Fair Trade has grown without any specific government aid and, at least at the beginning, 
without the cultural support of domestic and European institutions. The reason is that, in the 
beginning, Fair Trade was only a preoccupation for a small number of citizens who were 
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unsatisfied with the levels of development aid and/or of regulation in international trade. Thus, 
the government had no incentive to intervene in a matter that didn’t interest the “median voter”. 
It is in this context that nonprofit pioneers have emerged as a response from unsatisfied 
citizens. However, as Fair Trade has developed tremendously and has become a concern for the 
median voter22, the government is now much more eager to be interested in this sector. 
Among available policy options, a fiscal preference for ATOs is unlikely because of the very 
nature of FT organizations as social enterprises creating public goods but competing in the 
market with for-profit firms. Even by considering their social role, such fiscal policy would be 
likely to be considered as discriminatory and unfair in that it would establish an illicit support 
to one specific player in the competitive race.  
More in general and beyond this specific measure, even though there is a certain consensus on 
the fact that public authorities should not participate directly to FT competition, it cannot be 
denied that their decisions on the rules of the game may have a crucial influence in promoting 
social responsibility as a competitive market feature. Three are the main policy suggestions 
which easily stem from this consideration. First, SR-oriented procurement rules may be crucial 
since the minimum price as the unique competitive criterion is definitely in contrast with the 
goal of promoting corporate social responsibility. An inspection of the current experiences in 
this field shows that many domestic and local authorities have incorporated this new principle 
by attributing scores to socially and environmentally responsible features of bidders and, in 
some cases, by imposing them to provide a share of FT products in the procurement rules 
(Poncelet et al., 2004). 
Second, compulsory information on the social rating of sellers and on the social characteristics 
of the value chain in the main retail outlets would be a zero cost rule which could give a boost 
to the competition on social responsibility, bridging the gap between consumers’ willingness to 
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pay and actual market shares23 and pushing corporations to internalize negative externalities 
and the problem of insufficient provision of public goods.   
Third, in a context of competition where some players propose different types of ethical labels 
and even different versions of Fair Trade (“light” FT labels), the government itself can 
establish a FT norm in order to determine a minimal content for what can be called Fair Trade. 
Such a process in already advanced in France and in Belgium, and could be extended at a 
European level. It seems clear that such a definition has the potential to influence strongly the 
competition if the FT sector, in favor of the ATOs or in favor of the for-profit imitators, 
thereby creating further stimulus for the diffusion of SR.24 
4. Conclusion 
Fair Trade represents one of the most interesting examples of a breakthrough innovation in the 
functioning of contemporary economic systems. With their “portfolio vote”, FT consumers are 
also a challenge to the standard reductionist definition of homo oeconomicus preferences. Their 
willingness to pay in excess for the social characteristics of the products (not just declared but 
revealed through their purchases) comes in support of a new set of theories which see fairness 
(Fehr and Schmidt, 1999), inequity aversion, sympathy and commitment (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976) as additional important motivations of economic choices. The novel feature of 
FT consumption is that, for the first time, fairness and inequity aversion are not related to 
neighbors or co-workers but to distant producers, thereby documenting a significant 
enlargement of the reference group which individuals consider in their choice.  
Furthermore, Fair Trade is, in some sense, contributing to improve the reputation of the market 
since it makes it not just the place in which exchanges purely reflect (often) imbalanced 
bargaining power and endowments of buyers and sellers, but also that in which it is possible to 
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contribute to reduce such imbalances by “exchanging values” and voting for the production of 
global public goods.  
In this context, the scope of this paper has been to investigate the complexity of the 
organizational dynamics within the FT sector. We have started by analyzing the unusual 
characteristics of FT products and studying how these characteristics explain the emergence of 
a variety of players. We have seen that the FT product includes a bundle of physical and 
immaterial features that distinguish it from standard products. Fair Trade therefore constitutes 
an innovation in the sense that it allows to combine a commercial dimension with fairness and 
socio-political goals. We have seen, then, that the distinction between these different 
dimensions is crucial in explaining the emergence of FT players under different legal forms. 
Then, we have tried to document the dynamics among these different types of players through 
three fundamental dimensions: competition, conflict and partnership. The first has been 
represented by the competition between pioneer ATOs and for-profit partial imitators. The 
second has been illustrated by the conflicts of interest among worldshops, importers and 
labeling organizations. Thirdly, partnership has been described and illustrated, on the vertical 
as well as on the horizontal dimension. 
Finally, including the role of the State with respect to these interactions, we have analyzed to 
what extent the interactions among the different types of players will be crucial for the survival 
and strengthening of the core of Fair Trade: that of “creating (economic) value with values”.  
In a very famous, stimulating and provocative quote Keynes said in 1931 that “For at least 
another hundred years we must pretend to ourselves and to every one that fair is foul and foul 
is fair; for foul is useful and fair is not [underlined is ours]. Avarice and usury and precaution 
must be our gods for a little longer still. For only they can lead us out of the tunnel of economic 
necessity into daylight." (Keynes, 1931) 
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Keynes’ sentence focuses on the dichotomy between requirements of economic growth on the 
one side, and social justice or moral values on the other side. Since “foul” is useful (for 
economic growth) and “fair” is not we should follow the “law of necessity” (doing what is foul 
or not necessarily ethically relevant) and pretend that our action is reconciled with social 
values.  For what we have said and for its ability of creating economic value with values, in 
spite of all its imperfections and limits, Fair Trade seems to overcome such dichotomy with its 
capacity of making the “fair useful” (or of creating added economic value with values such as 
fairness), thereby crucially abridging the 100-year “transition” of the Keynes’ prophecy.  
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Figure 1. The static Hotelling game of ethical imitation and the asymmetric costs of 






Legend: buying a product at one’s left in the ethical segment implies choosing a product 
below one’s own ethical standards while buying a product at one’s right implies choosing 
a product above one’s own ethical standards. We assume that the marginal costs of 
distance are higher in the first than in the second case. 
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1
 Fair Trade sales reached 900 million $ worldwide in 2003 (Nicholls & Opal, 2005), and 660 million $ in Europe 
in 2004 (Krier, 2005); market shares range from 1 or 2% for several products up to 20% for coffee in the UK and 
even 50% for bananas in Switzerland (Krier, 2005) . 
2
 30 to 40% annual growth for FLO-labelled products (FLO, 2005). 
3
 In the literature on development, the terms “North” and “South” refer to the geopolitical division of the world 
between, respectively, developed and developing countries. In this article, these terms will be used as synonyms. 
4
 Even though the term “FTO” (“Fair Trade organization”) would be more accurate, we will keep the term “ATO” 
so as to remain in line with the literature on the issue. 
5
 FINE is an informal network gathering the four main Fair Trade umbrella organs: EFTA (European Fair Trade 
Association), NEWS (Network European Worldshops), FLO INTERNATIONAL (Fair Trade Labelling 
Organizations) and IFAT (International Fair Trade Association). 
6
 The complexity of the informational asymmetry in fair trade products is that such products are not “experience 
goods” with regard to their socially responsible dimension. In other terms, while many dimensions of 
informational asymmetries about product quality may be overcome by purchase and taste, repeated purchase of 
fair trade products cannot help consumers to verify the truthfulness of the ethical characteristics of the products.  
7
 Indeed, as explained earlier, it can be assumed that consumers do not buy FT products by pure altruism but that 
they gain an emotional or psychological return from the FT purchase in terms of self-identity reinforcement, guilt 
avoidance or values satiation. Thanks to an anonymous referee for pointing at this issue. 
8
 On of the most interesting examples of “second mover moves” is documented by the BBC press report of 
October the 7th, 2000 when it is announced that “Nestle has launched a fair trade instant coffee as it looks to tap 
into growing demand among consumers.” The BBC commented the news saying that “Ethical shopping is an 
increasing trend in the UK, as consumers pay more to ensure poor farmers get a better deal.” and reported the 
comment of Fiona Kendrick, Nestle's UK head of beverages arguing that “Specifically in terms of coffee, fair trade 
is 3% of the instant market and has been growing at good double-digit growth and continues to grow." 
9
 The Fair Trade and the Co-operative movement share a partially common ideology and similar economic 
mechanisms. For a comparison between the two initiatives, see for example Develtere and Pollet (2005). 
 37 
                                                                                                                                                           
10
 We will include further the apparition of a recognized Fair Trade label. 
11
 For a description of such information asymmetries and monopsonistic situations faced by small-scale producers, 
see for example the book written by the founders of the label Max Havelaar (Roozen & van der Hoff, 2001). 
12
 We still consider a situation where there is no Fair Trade labeling. 
13
 The term “for-profit” is widely used in the literature that compares different types of organizations (“for-profit” 
being opposed to “nonprofit” or “not-for-profit”). We will use “for-profit” and “mainstream” as synonyms, even 
though it is clear that all the mainstream companies involved in Fair Trade are not necessarily aiming at 
maximizing their profits. The existence of alternative objectives to profit maximization for these companies is 
already an interesting finding that should relativize the emphasis on legal frameworks. 
14
 In our previous analysis, we considered the Fair Trade niche as the starting point and thus presented for-profit 
companies as arriving on a market occupied by nonprofit and co-operative pioneers. In this part, the market is seen 
in a wider sense (for example the food market), so that it is ATOs that arrive on a market occupied by mainstream 
companies. 
15
 This result is robust to changes in the linearity/non linearity, symmetry/asymmetry of ethical distance costs, but 
has not been verified beyond the typical limits of standard product differentiation models (more than two players, 
non unit consumer demand). 
16
 The first case is that of “concerned consumers” buying “non ethical” products. The second is that of 
unconcerned consumers buying FT products. Also in the second case there may be a psychological cost if 
consumers do not agree with FT principles or believe that FT is inefficient or a waste of money. 
17
 Costs of providing SR products include the purchase of a label or a certification, the construction of a solid 
ethical reputation or, if the company tries to cheat on the SR quality,  the risk of being detected and of suffering a 
reputation flaw that is very likely to be much more harmful than if no SR quality had been announced. 
18
 In the simplification of the model, the two firms sell a single product which may be conceived as representing in 
the reality their entire product range. In this perspective, “high SR quality” simply means that, for ATOs, the 
entire product range follows FT criteria while, for the imitator, only one or a few products follow them, the rest of 
the production being not subject to SR screening. This is what occurs for most mainstream for-profit firms, for 
instance for Nestlé which recently launched its first FT product in 7 October 2005 (see endnote 7) and for 
Starbucks which introduced a fair trade coffee among those sold in their shops. 
19
 These considerations provide additional arguments to the querelle on the relative convenience of the Fair Trade 
versus the standard trade plus donation scheme (LeClair, 2004). In addition to them, FT capacity of breaking the 
monopsony/oligopsony power of local intermediaries, consultancy services of fair-traders and capacity of 
triggering partial imitation in competitors are other arguments in favor of the FT solution.  As a matter of fact, a 
standard trade plus donation scheme does not share with FT these three properties. A crucial issue in 
discriminating between the two options is related to the capacity of Fair Trade to create dynamically competitive 
advantages for local producers.   
20
 World shops are Fair Trade outlets that have been set up by pioneer ATOs. In most European countries, world 
shops still constitute an important distribution channel for FT products. According to the figures provided by Krier 
(2005), world shop sales accounted for nearly 20% of total FT sales in Europe in 2005. 
21
 We can assume that FT products provide lower margins compared to traditional ones since, by definition, Fair 
Trade gives more to local producers without passing this difference totally on to the consumers. Unless we assume 
that willingness to pay will grow at a very high level, this will reasonably continue to be the case. 
22
 A recent study on the notoriety of Fair Trade among the public opinion in Belgium indicates that nearly 80% of 
the population knows what Fair Trade is about, although only a third of the population has already bought FT 
products (Sonecom, 2006). 
23
 Empirical evidence generally shows that “virtual” market shares extracted by the consumers’ willingness to pay 
are higher than actual market shares. A large part of this difference depends on the fact that the responses in terms 
of willingness to pay include the possibility of choosing between a more and less socially responsible product on 
the same market. This choice is often not possible in the reality but would be much more so in presence of the 
above mentioned compulsory information rule. 
 
 
 
 
